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IN THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
Case No. 12474 
PETER LEONARD LYON, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLA1:rT 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is a criminal action for failure to stop a 
vehicle at the co1'!Illand of a police officer, cormnonly known 
as "evading a police officer", a violation of §41-6-169.10, 
U.C.A., 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted upon a jury verdict of 
guilty of the offense of evading a police officer. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment of convic-
tion entered against him. 
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STATEl1ENT OF FACTS 
On July 27, 1977, at 4:00 a.m., Weber State College 
Security Officer Terry Carpenter was en route from the main 
campus to patrol the new Dee Events Center. (T. 3) . The Dee 
Events Center is not contiguous to the main campus but is 
located approximately four blocks to the south. (T. 5). 
Hr. Carpenter observed Appellant on a motorcycle 
stopped at the intersection of Taylor Avenue and Country Hills 
Drive. (T.6). The intersection is located in a residential 
district approximately equidistant from the main campus and 
the Dee Events Center. (Exh. D-1). Taylor Avenue jogs as 
it intersects with Country Hills Drive and, as Mr. Carpenter 
approached the intersection from the north, he first observed 
Appellant from a distance of approximately one-half block. 
(T.30). 
Appellant testified that his motorcycle had killed 
as he stopped at the stop sign at Country Hills Drive. He 
used the kick-starter to start it again, turned right and 
proceeded up Country Hills Drive. (T.86-87). 
Officer Carpenter became suspicious, as he testified 
A. I observed the motorcycle. As I approach-
ed the intersection, it caught my eye irrrrnediate-
ly because there was no movement at all; nothing 
else moving. He appeared to me to lay the motor-
cycle down, and out of my own wondering, with 
the amount of destruction that we've had at 
the Dee Center, I wondered had he been involved 
with something at the Dee Center. Were his 
arms full of things that he was trying to ditch 
or something like that? Has something wrong 
- 2-
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with his bike? Had it quit? I had no idea. 
It was 4:00 o'clock in the morning. I 
assumed that he was either having problems 
or he was hiding from me; one of the two. 
So I made the turn from Taylor eastbound 
on 4200, and as I made the turn, he brought 
the bike right back up and made a right-
hand turn and proceeded eastbound across 
Skyline Drive. (T.10). 
~1r. Carpenter testified that Appellant accelerated 
rapidly, based on the sound of the motorcycle, but didn't 
know what speed he was going. (T.11). Appellant stated 
that he accelerated to approximately 30 miles per hour. 
(T. 87). Officer Carpenter turned on his overhead emergency 
lights when he reached the intersection where Appellant was 
originally stopped. (T.14). 
In response to questions by the Deputy County Attor-
ney, Mr. Carpenter testified: 
Q. Do you recall how long you were on Taylor 
looking across at the other individual? 
A. Not a great deal of time. Maybe, oh, 
gosh, I would think five seconds would be 
the very, very most, and I doubt if it 
was anywhere near that long. Long enough 
that I observed him and flashed through my 
mind had he been in the Dee Center? Was 
he involved with something there? Or was 
he just having problems? I had no idea. 
Q. Describe for the Court and jury what 
your intentions were so far as going over 
there to this individual? 
A. Initially when I made the turn, my 
intentions were to inquire of him who he 
was, what he was doing at this time of 
the morning. Or it I would have gotten 
close and realized that his motorcycle was 
stalled, I would have done what I could to 
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help him. Or give hi~ transportation or 
take him home. Something of that nature, 
which we frequently do with the students on 
campus. (T.11-12). 
Officer Carpenter could point to no facts which wou: 
link Appellant to the Dee Events Center other than the fact 
that it was located approximately two blocks away. He actec 
solely out of suspicion. 
Q. Let me ask you this, Hr. Carpenter: On 
this evening prior to the time you saw Mr. 
Lyon, did anybody complain to you about a 
motorcycle and a motorcycle driver on the 
premises of the Dee Special Events Center? 
A. ~To, sir. 
Q. No complaints whatsoever? 
A. No. 
* * 
Q. Yes. So you'd been on duty some five hours. 
In the normal course of events, how many times 
would you have checked the Dee Special Events 
Center on an average in those five hours? 
A. It varies. Maybe only once or twice. 
Maybe I'd have checked it five or six times. 
Q. So at least once or twice you'd been over 
there. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Hadn't observed any people around there, 
had you? 
A. Yes, I'd run out people prior to that 
time, I believe. 
Q. What time was that? I,m talking about 
this particular evening. 
, 
- c+-
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A. I honestly don't recall whether I'd run 
out anyone at all. It was a common occur-
rence to find people there and just ask them 
to leave. 
Q. I see. You didn't find anybody there 
with a motorcycle that evening, did you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. See any suspicious motorcycle tracks 
around the Dee Events Center that evening 
before you saw Mr. Lyon? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Hear any motorcycles churning around in the 
dirt out there just before you saw Mr. Lyon? 
A. Uo, sir. 
Q. No reports from any other police officers 
or employees of the college I take it that 
there was anything annoying going on at the 
events center that evening? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. I guess after the fact you didn't find any 
damage done that night or motorcycle prints 
or anything like that after you checked it out 
later? 
A. I never did get time to recheck it. 
Q. Did anything come to your knowledge about 
anybody on a motorcycle doing any damage at 
the ~ee Events Center. 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Nobody had broken in that nisht that you 
know of? 
A. i'Jo, sir. 
Q. No question is there then that when you 
initially observed Mr. Lyon on the motor-
cycle that that is not college property, is 
it? 
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A. No, sir, it is not. 
Q. Where he turned up here on Country Hills 
Drive, that's not college property, is it? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And where you originally put your lights 
on right up here about Beus' Pond and your 
siren and gave him a signal to stop, that's 
not college property either, is it? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Well, you testified that when you saw the 
bike going down, you thought he might have 
sonething in his arms, is that correct? 
A. I wondered, yes. 
Q. Did you see anything in his arms? 
A. No, sir, I did not. 
Q. Pretty good sized motorcycle he was driving, 
wasn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Probably weighs three, 400 pounds? 
A. I would believe, yes. 
Q. Kind of hard to drive that I guess holding 
something in his arms as you've demonstrated 
to the jury, wouldn't it? 
A. He has a big gas tank on top of that. Be 
very easy to put materials on that. 
Q. But did you see anything on top of the gas 
tank? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Or if you saw anything on the gas tank, it 
probably would have fallen off, wouldn't it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see anything that had fallen off 
at this intersection? 
-6-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. C-lo, sir. 
Q. Well, tell me this, Officer Carpenter, just 
what facts could you point to at the tioe you 
first observed Mr. Lyon on the motorcycle that 
he was in the process of committing a crime or 
that he had committed a crime? What facts did 
you have? 
A. None. 
Q. No facts whatsoever? Just suspicious? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And I guess people do drive along this road, 
is that true? 
A. I'm sure they do, yes. 
Q. Isn't this a big housing development up 
in here? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And I guess there are only two ways out 
of the housing development; come down 46th 
on Harrison or go over to Taylor and south, 
is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And I guess there's not much traffic at 
4:00 a.m., but you sometimes do see people 
driving around city streets at 4:00 a.m., 
is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Hotorcycles and cars both? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Sometimes rnotorcycles will kill and you 
have to use the kick starter and kick start 
them back into action, is that true. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Sometimes you kick start a motorcycle and 
you jump down and then pull it back up and go, 
don't you? (Indicating) 
A. Yes, sir. ('I'. 40-44). 
- 7 _ 
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Appellant failed to stop for the overhead lights 
and siren, was caught, and charged with evading a police 
officer. 
ARGU11ENT 
POinT I 
THE LOWER COURT SHOULD HAVE RULED AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THAT THE COLLEGE SECURITY OFFICER ACTED OUTSIDE OF HIS 
AUTHORITY IN ATTE~1PTinG TO STOP APPELLANT AHD THE REFUSAL 
TO DISMISS AT THE co~~CLUSION OF THE STATE' s CASE WAS ERROR 
Al.'ID APPELLANT HAS ERRONEOUSLY CONVICTED. 
At the conclusion of the State's case, Appellant 
moved to dismiss on the grounds that the prosecution had 
failed to prove that the College security officer was act-
ing within the scope of his authority when he first attempted 
to stop Appellant. (T. 51). The lower court denied the motior. 
and submitted the issue to the jury. (T.55). 
One of the elements of the offense, as set forth by 
the lower court in Instruction 5, was as follows: 
4. That the signal to stop was in fact 
given by a peace officer acting within 
his legal authority ... 
Appellant submits that the security officer was not acting 
within his legal authority at the time and place where he 
gave Appellant a signal to stop as is required for prosecu-
tion under §41-6-169.10, U.C.A., 1953. 
The authority of college security officers is speci-
fically set forth in §53-45-5, U.C.A., 1953, which provides 
in relevant part: 
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Members of the police or security depart-
ment o~ any state institution of higher 
education . . . shall be peace officers 
and shall also have all of the powers pos-
sessed by policemen in cities ... prb-
vidin9. however'. th~t.such aowers may e 
exercised only in cities an counties in 
which such institution, its branches or 
properties are located and only in con-
nection with acts occurrina on the ro-
Terty o sue institution or w en required 
or the rotection of its interests, oro-
perty, stu ents or emp oyees, m-
phasis Added). 
This case is controlled by State In Interest of 
Hurley, 28 Utah 2d 248, 501 P.2d 111 (1972), wherein this 
Court construed the foregoin8 statute as it related to the 
activities of a security officer from the University of Utah. 
In Hurley, the officer was patrolling an alley located one-
half block from the campus in an area where a fraternity and 
a religious institute for students was located and where 
students often parked their cars. He observed two juveniles 
who were apparently working on the engine of a car and he 
stopped to inquire whether they needed assistance. Upon re-
ceiving vague and suspicious answers to his questions the 
officer requested identification and a scuffle ensued. Hurley 
attempted to hinder the subjugation of his companion and was 
arrested and convicted of interfering with an officer. 
The key issue in Hurley was whether the officer was 
acting within the scope of his official duty as a policeman. 
The Court had to determine whether the officer's patrol of 
the off-campus alley was within the purview of the phrase 
-9-
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"when required for the protection of its interests, property, 
students or employees." 501 P.2d at 113. 
This Court held that the officer in Hurley was not 
acting within the scope of his official duty, stating: 
There emerges from the statute a legisla-
tive intent to restrict the extra-territorial 
exercise of power of these institutional 
police, with one sole exception. The phrase-
ology "when required for the protection" in-
dicates some type of exigent circumstances 
which impels illl!Ilediate response. The word 
"interests" is broad and all inclusive; how-
ever, when it is considered in association 
with the words "property, students, or em-
ployees" its general import appears appro-
priately restricted to these subjects. Thus, 
the legislature, in this exception, has 
granted power to these institutional police, 
beyond the property of the institution, only 
under some type of exigent circumstances, 
where the direct and immediate interests of 
the institution concerning its property, 
students, or employees is involved. Id. 
It was noted that the only asserted "interests" of the Uni-
versity were the proximity of the alley, the nearness of a 
fraternity and religious institute and the fact that Univer-
sity students often parked in the alley. This Court ruled, 
"These interests were too remote and indirect to invoke the 
extraterritorial exception in Section 53-45-5, U.C.A., 1953." 
(Emphasis Added). 
The rationale behind this Court's decision in 
Hurley is apparent. There is no need to have college sec-
urity officers perform general police functions in the resi-
dential areas surrounding the college. This job is ably 
performed by city police and county sheriffs. The sole 
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reason for the existence of campus police is to protect those 
interests which were so narrowly cirumscribed in Hurley. 
Obviously the Legislature did not intend to establish an 
independent police force with a general jurisdiction coter-
minous with that of the city in which the institution is 
located. 
Similarly, in Courange v. State, 510 P.2d 961 (Ok. 
Crim. App. 1973), the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma 
held that a campus policeman had no authority to arrest a 
person for "driving under the influence" when the offense 
occurred on a public road and not on university property. 
The Oklahoma statute was akin to that of Utah and provided 
in relevant part as follows: 
Any campus policeman . shall have 
all the powers vested by law in peace of-
ficers . . in the protection and guarding 
of grounds, buildings, and equipment of the 
institution. . . 510 P.2d at 962. 
The clear meaning of the statute and cases cited is 
that a campus officer operating off college property does 
not possess the same power to investigate suspicious conduct, 
short of the actual commission of a crime, as would a police 
officer duly constituted to act in that jurisdiction. The 
campus officer must be able to point to some "exigent circum-
stances where the direct and immediate interests of the insti-
tution concerning its property, students, or employees is 
involved." 501 P.2d at 113. Any broader interpretation of 
the limitations of a campus policeman's authority would be 
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unconstitutionally va~ue If the determination of what con-
stituted the "interests" of the college were left to the 
whim and caprice of an individual officer, the statute would 
lack the degree of clarity required in Great Salt Lake Author-
ity v. Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 276, 421 P.2d 504 (196i 
(Eminent domain authority held unconstitutional for failure 
to clearly define its limits) . 
In the instant case the security officer was unable 
to point to any of the requisite exigent circumstances. He 
mentioned two acts of vandalism which occurred several weeks 
prior to Appellant's arrest but which were not connected in 
any way with Appellant. All he could point to were the hour 
of the night, the proximity of college property and the 
arguably suspicious action of tipping the motorcycle to one 
side then driving away. There was no evidence that, prior to 
the time the security officer turned on his overhead lights, 
that Appellant had committed any crime or traffice offense. 
Nothing tied Appellant to the College or its interests other 
than the fact that he was approximately two blocks from the 
Dee Events Center. 
It should be noted in Hurley that the scene of the 
arrest was closer to unversity property that that in the 
instant case and the alley was used by students for parking. 
Moreover, the conduct of the juveniles was much more sus-
picious than that of Appellant. The juveniles were actually 
working on a vehicle, the ownership of which they could not 
-12-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
explain. Here, it is difficult to credit the security officer's 
impression that Appellant was atternpting to hide from him by 
laying his motorcyle down in an open, well-lit intersection. 
The officer had no more than mere suspicions and decided to 
investigate further. He had no authority to use his emergency 
signals to order Appellant to stop. 
It is well established that a public officer who acts 
beyond the limits of his authorized jurisdiction is treated 
as a private citizen. The rule is set forth in 5 Am.Jur.2d 
"Arrest" §50, (1962) as follows: 
A public officer appointed as a conservator 
of the peace for a particular county or 
municipality as a general rule has no of-
ficial power to apprehend off enders beyond 
the boundaries of the county or district 
for which he is appointed, unless statutes 
so provide. 
tforeover, it is stated in Kilbreck and Porter, Law of Arrest 
and Seizure, 1st Ed. (1965), p.63: 
Peace officers of limited authorith are only 
peace officers when carrying out t e duties 
of their respective employment. (Emphasis 
Added). 
The law in Utah follows this general rule. In People 
v. Coughlin, 13 Utah 58, 44 Pac.94 (1896), this Court held 
that a constable could not arrest outside of his county in 
the capacity of a peace officer but could do so as a private 
citizen if the statutory requirements were met. See State 
In Interest of Hurley, supra. 
Further, the Office of the Utah Attorney General has 
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issued an opinion which indicates that officers of limited 
authority, acting outside of their geographical or otherwise 
authorized limits, act only as private citizens. Opinion 
of the Utah Attorney General, 63-019, 1963 - 1964 Biennial, 
(March 11, 1963), p.136. 
In the present case, when Mr. Carpenter acted he did 
so as a private person and not as a police officer within 
the meaning of §41-6-169.10, U.C.A., 1953. Since this statute 
does not recognize an offense of failure to stop for a privat< 
citizen or evading a private citizen, no crime has been esta-
blished. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT'S INSTRUCTION COHCERNING THE STA1mA..Pj 
TO BE APPLIED rn DETERHINING WHETHER T~1E OFFICER WAS ACTING 
WITHIN HIS AUTHORITY WAS ERROR. 
follows: 
The lower court instructed the jury, in part, as 
You are instructed that a peace officer 
of a college in Utah has authority to act on 
the college property. He also may act in the 
area surrounding the institution, but only 
when it would reasonably appear to a prudent 
erson that such act was in fact reasonable 
or t e rotection o 
nstruction No. 
Appellant submits that the instruction constituted 
prejudicial error since it substituted a relaxed "reasonable 
man" standard for the strict standard set forth in the 
statute and holding of this Court. 
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The statute provides that a campus officer r:iay act 
off-campus "only . 
. when required for the protection of 
its interests, property, students or employees." §53-45-5, 
U.C.A., 1953. (Emphasis Added). There is a huge difference 
between whether an act is "reasonable" for their protection 
and when it is "required" for their protection. 
Further, as noted in POii.'TT I, this Court held in 
Hurley, supra: 
Thus, the legislature, in this exception, 
has granted power to these institutional 
police, beyond the property of the insti-
t~tion, only under some t~~e of exigent 
circumstances, where the irect and im-
mediate interests of the institution 
concerning its property, students, or 
em~loyees is involved. 501 P.2d at 
11 . (Emphasis Added). 
The standard enunciated by this Court is far more strict 
than the "reasonable" standard contained in the jury instruc-
tion. It cannot be said that the jury did not apply the 
lesser standard in convicting Appellant and, thus, the instruc-
tion was prejudicial error. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT'S INSTRUCTION REGARDING HOT PURSUIT 
THROUGH A PEACE OFFICER'S JURISDICTION WAS ERROR. 
As part of Instruction No. 6 the lower court instruc-
ted the jury as follows: 
If a peace officer acts outside his jurisdic-
tion, he acts as an ordinary citizen and he 
has no powers beyond those of an ordinary 
citizen and a person who evades him would not 
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be evading a peace officer. However, if the 
person flees into or through the peace officer's 
jurisdiction, it might take on the character of 
a neace officer's activities and so continue as 
lo~ as the oeace ofticer is in "hot ursuit", 
t at is irectly attempting to capture or catch. 
(Emphasis Added . 
Appellant submits that the quoted portion of the instruction 
was a misstatement of the applicable law and the jury could 
have relied on it to convict Appellant. 
The testisony indicated that several blocks after 
the officer first attempted to stop Appellant, the city road 
on which they were travelling was, for a short distance, abut-
ted on both sides by college property. (T. 46). It is undis-
puted, however, that the attempt to stop Appellant and the 
subsequent pursuit began well outside of college property. 
(T.42). 
The power of a peace officer to arrest a person in 
another jurisdiction in situations involving "fresh pursuit" 
is recognized in §77-13-36(l)(a), U.C.A., 1953. The teTIIJ. 
"fresh pursuit" is defined in §77-13-26, U.C.A., 1953, as 
follows: 
The term, "fresh pursuit", as used in this act 
shall include fresh pursuit as defined by the 
colIIIIlon law and also the pursuit of a person 
who has committed a felony or who is reasonably 
sus ected of havin committed a felon . It 
s a a so inc u e the pursuit o a person 
suspected of having committed a supposed felony, 
thou h no felony has actually been colIIIIlitted, if 
t ere is reasona e roun tor e ievin t at a 
e ont as een committe . Fres pursuit as 
usederein shall not necessarily imply instant 
pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay. 
(Emphasis Added). 
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The co=on law definition of "fresh pursuit" is set 
forth in 5 Am. Jur. 2d "Arrest" §51 (1962), as follows: 
Under the common-law doctrine of fresh pursuit, 
an officer may pursue a felon or a suspected 
felon, with or without warrant, into another 
JUrlSdiction and arrest him there. Similar 
powers are sometimes conferred by statute. The 
cormnon-law doctrine, however, a ulies onl ~ 
cases o ~e ony. mp asLs A 
The instruction was erroneous since the offense in-
valved in the present case was at most a misdemeanor. More 
importantly, the doctrine of fresh pursuit necessarily implies 
that the officer was justified in beginning the pursuit in the 
first place. It is tortured logic to state that a pursuit 
which was cor:nnenced as a private citizen through the unlawful 
use of emergency signals, (See POINT IV), suddently became 
the offense of evading a police officer and a fresh pursuit 
because the Appellant fortuitously travelled through college 
property. This approach ignores the fact that the officer's 
unjustified actions created the situation in the first place. 
Clearly the doctrine of fresh pursuit is unapplicable 
in the instant case and the instruction constituted prejudi-
cial error because the jury could have found Appellant guilty 
on the basis of the erroneous instruction even if it found 
that the security officer was unjustified in initially attempt-
ing to stop Appellant. The authority of the officer to stop 
Appellant must be determined at the point he first turned 
on the overhead lights. If he lacked authority initially, it 
may not be cured by the subsequent chain of events. 
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Further, the use of the word "might" in the instruc-
tion is too vague and leaves far too much latitude to the 
jury. 
POE1T IV 
THE LOWER COURT'S IllSTRUCTiotl CONCERNING THE POWER 
OF AN ORDINARY CITIZEll TO ARREST FOR A MISDEMEA110R WAS ERROR. 
As part of Instruction No. 6 the lower court stated. 
"A private citizen may arrest for a misdemeanor i=ediately 
observed by the citizen." This is a correct statement of 
the law. §77-13-4, U.C.A., 1953. However, Appellant submits 
that this portion of the instruction was prejudicial error 
because it was not supported by the evidence and could have 
misled the jury. 
Nowhere in the transcript is there any evidence that 
the security officer observed Appellant committing a misdemeanc 
prior to the time he turned on his overhead lights. (T. 43, 49 
Therefore, if he was acting as a private citizen, he 
had no authority to try to stop Appellant in the first place. 
Moreover, the use of emergency lights and signals by a private 
citizen is prohibited. §41-6-140, U.C.A., 1953. 
Under the instruction as 8iven, the jury could have 
been misled and convicted Appellant even if it found that the 
officer was acting as a private citizen. The prejudicial 
effect of this portion of the instruction would then be com-
pounded by the "hot pursuit" instruction referred to in POINT 
III. 
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CONCLUS IOC1 
Appellant was improperly convicted. The facts in 
the case clearly show that Officer Carpenter was acting beyond 
his statutory authority and, therefore, only as a private 
citizen. There was no evasion of a police officer. The jury 
was improperly instructed concerning the standard to be applied 
to determine whether the officer exceeded his authority, the 
doctrine of fresh pursuit and the arrest powers of a private 
citizen. The conviction should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of March, 1978. 
-· /'' /~--
By: ~- 1 , 
0
_1, .~'//,/, /j; "7,·c_~·.: Z.. ~ 
Francis M. Wikstrom 
Attorney for Appellant 
543 Twenty-Fifth Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
*******"''**********-;'*** 
I hereby certify that on this _l{)___ day of March, 
1978, I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant, 
postage prepaid to Robert B. Hansen, Utah Attorney General, 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
Tori H. Thurston, Secretary 
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